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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-STATE ACTION-EFFECT OF STATE COURT INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT-Mrs. Doris Walker, president of her local union,
was discharged by Cutter Laboratories in 1949 because of membership in
the Communist Party and falsification of her employment application. The
employer acquired knowledge of these facts in 1947, but did not act at that
time to avoid charges of persecuting a union officer. The union, pursuant
to the collective bargaining agreement, which authorized discharge for
"just cause" only, sought and obtained reinstatement from the arbitration
board, which action was affirmed by the district court of appeal,1 but reversed by the California Supreme Court.2 On certiorari to the United
States Supreme Court,3 the union contended that the state court's decision
rested on a public policy against membership in the Communist Party in
violation of the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Held, writ dismissed, three justices dissenting. Since the
state court construed the agreement to mean that membership in the Communist Party is "just cause" for discharge, the decision can be sustained on
adequate state grounds and there is no basis for review of constitutional
questions. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956).
An examination of the California Supreme Court's opinion raises a
question as to whether the majority of the United States Supreme Court
did not overestimate the significance of the former court's statement alluding to the effect of the contract.4 Assuming, however, that the majority is

Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 266 P. (2d) 92 (1954).
Mabel Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 43 Cal. (2d) 788, 278 P. (2d) 905 (1955).
350 U.S. 816 (1955).
See the first sentence of the dissenting opinion in the California Supreme Court,
note 2 supra, at 809. The California Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to review
the arbitration board's construction of the contract. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. (Deering, 1953)
§1288. See also the opinion of the district court of appeal, note 1 supra. The California
Supreme Court, immediately after indicating that the ground of appeal was that the board
had exceeded its power, launched into an eight-page discussion of public policy and the
1
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correct in its interpretation of the California decision, there remains a
federal question which would seem to have merited consideration by the
whole court. The restrictive covenant cases, beginning with Shelley v.
Kraemer,5 established the doctrine that a state court's enforcement of a
contract is a state act, and that the enforcement of covenants restricting the
sale or use of real property on a racial basis is unconstitutional as a denial
of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.6 In Shelley v.
Kraemer the Court denied injunctive relief, and this doctrine was later
extended to preclude an action for damages, even when the suit was against
a person not of the class discriminated against, because of the overbalancing
consideration of public policy against enforcing these contracts.7 The
Fourteenth Amendment, which forbids the states to discriminate on the
basis of race, together with the First Amendment, also denies the power to
discriminate against a political group. 8 Does it follow, then, that the
majority's decision is inconsistent with the rule of Shelley v. Kraemer because it allows the state, through the enforcement of a private contract, to
interfere with Mrs. Walker's freedom of political belief when she has been
charged with no wrongful act? 9 In Shelley v. Kraemer, the Court was careful to point out that the racially restrictive covenant was not void as unconstitutional, because the prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment
apply only to states, not to individuals. The Court specified that a violation occurred only in the granting of affirmative relief by the state.1°
What, then, is the legal status of these restrictive covenants? Since the
Supreme Court said that the unconstitutional act occurred when the state
court granted affirmative relief, it was suggested that such covenants would
still constitute a valid defense to a claim for affirmative relief because this
would not require state action. There appears to be some logic in this
argument, on the theory that since the covenant is not void, a party should
not be held liable for acting in accordance with its provisions. The question came before the Supreme Court in an Iowa case11 where burial privileges were denied an Indian on the basis of a discriminatory covenant
which was asserted as a defense to a tort claim brought by the owner of
a cemetery plot.1 2 The Court was evenly divided and later dismissed
Communist Party, note 2 supra, at 798. There was no discussion in the opinion concerning the matter of contract enforcement except for a single rhetorical sentence at the end
of the opinion.
5 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Hurd v. Hodge, 334 U.S. 24 (1948); Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S.
249 (1953); 3 A.L.R. (2d) 441 (1949).
6 Groves, "Judicial Interpretation of the Holdings of the United States Supreme Court
in Restrictive Covenant Cases,'' 45 Iu.. L. REv. 614 (1950).
7 Barrows v. Jackson, note 5 supra.
s De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
9 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
10 Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 at 19 (1948).
11 Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 348 U.S. 880 (1954).
12 The defense was upheld by the state supreme court, Rice v. Sioux City Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc., 245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W. (2d) no (1953). The court distinguished
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certiorari when state legislation was found to govern the case.13 The argument that such restrictions could be used defensively was flatly rejected by
a Texas court,14 which based its decision on Shelley v. Kraemer. There,
the covenant acted as a condition in the deed and the defendant in an
ejectment action attempted to support his claim to title on the operation
of this condition. Both of these cases involved property rights, but not in
exactly the same sense. In the Texas case, title to the property was involved, whereas the Iowa case involved an incident of ownership, not
ownership itself. The Texas case is easier because there the effect of the
covenant was affirmatively to shift title from one person to another. Both
of these cases differ from the principal case, however, in that the former
involved property rights, whereas the principal case concerned a purely contractual right. We thus have two grounds for distinguishing the principal
case from Shelley v. Kraemer15 and for defining the legal status of restrictive covenants. First, it is clear that affirmative relief cannot be predicated
upon such an agreement, whether the right affected is of property16 or
purely contractual.1 7 The Texas decision appears sound in denying the
covenant as a defense where the title to property is directly affected.1 8 A
more difficult question is raised by the Iowa case, and remains open, i.e.,
whether such a covenant can be asserted as a valid defense where enjoyment of property is involved, though the title itself is not in issue. On the
other hand, the principal case would indicate that such an agreement may
be properly asserted as a defense to an action involving a purely contractual
right. In support of this interpretation, it may be suggested that the courts
are not enforcing such a covenant, rather _that its existence simply makes it
impossible for the plaintiff to show a promise made in such terms as to
allow recovery. Any conclusions predicated upon the principal case must,
of course, be qualified by the fact that the majority did not discuss this
issue, although they in effect decided it. It might be well to consider
whether the disposition of the principal case would have been the same
had the contract justified discharge on racial grounds rather than on the
basis of membership in the Communist Party.
Dudley H. Chapman
Shelley v. Kraemer on the basis that the restrictive covenant was not being used as grounds
for affirmative relief.
lSRice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, 349 U.S. 70 (1955). Justice Frankfurter's opinion indicated that the Court had been troubled by the question of what
constituted state action. See Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town Corp., 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E. (2d)
541 (1949), cert. den. 339 U.S. 981 (1950); 14 A.L.R. (2d) 133 (1950).
14 Clifton v. Puente, (Tex. Civ. App. 1948) 218 S.W. (2d) 272.
15 First, the restrictive provision is being asserted as a defense and, second, the rights
affected are solely contractual, not of property.
16 Shelley v. Kraemer, note 10 supra.
17 Barrows v. Jackson, note 5 supra.
18 "It is as much an enforcement of the covenant to deny a person a legal right to
which he would be entitled except for the covenant as it would be to expressly command
by judicial order that the terms of the contract be recognized and carried out." Clifton v.
Puente, note 14 supra, at 274.

